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The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Action 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories1
Wendy Weber
This essay reflects upon the dilemmas of humanitarian action in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Its reflections center around 
the experience of Machsom Watch, an Israeli organization established 
in 2001 in response to the current closure regime that restricts the 
mobility of Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. 
Machsom Watch is not a traditional humanitarian organization in the 
sense of providing relief and/or protection in accordance with the prin-
ciples of impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Rather, it is an 
organization that works to protect human rights and to end Israel’s 
occupation of the Palestinian Territories that has integrated humanitar-
ian activities into its political work. As such, its experiences assisting 
Palestinians reveal both the dilemmas facing all humanitarian organi-
zations working in the OPT as well as the serious difficulties that con-
front organizations that combine humanitarian and political work.
The essay begins with a brief overview, first, of the current closure 
regime and its effects on Palestinian society and the economy of the 
West Bank, and second, of humanitarian efforts in the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territories and specifically the work of Machsom Watch. It then 
turns to the dilemmas of humanitarian action in the OPT, focusing in 
particular on the ways in which aid can help to sustain and bestow 
legitimacy upon Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian lands. The final 
part of the essay considers the ways in which organizations might 
respond to these dilemmas and try to minimize the possible negative 
effects of humanitarian aid. Here, it argues that both international 
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and local organizations must insist that Israel fulfill its responsibilities 
under international law and ensure, as well, that humanitarian aid is 
provided in compliance with international law. It also contends that all 
organizations, but especially those organizations that combine human-
itarian and political work, must resist the framing of their activities in 
humanitarian terms.
*****
The humanitarian situation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem 
has been documented in detail by international and local (Palestin-
ian and Israeli) non-governmental organizations as well as by the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UNOCHA). In their reports, these organizations have identified a 
number of key concerns including, but not limited to, mobility restric-
tions and the resulting decline in socio-economic conditions (including 
employment, food security, health, and education); lack of access to 
safe water; the demolition of Palestinian-owned structures by Israeli 
authorities; settler attacks on Palestinians and their property; and the 
absence of effective law enforcement in response to such attacks. Given 
the constraints of this essay, I will focus my discussion on one key 
aspect of the current situation: the restrictions on Palestinians’ free-
dom of movement. These restrictions and their effect on Palestinian 
lives and livelihoods were identified by the United Nations Country 
Team in June 2008 as being among those factors that have “the greatest 
impact on the current humanitarian situation in the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territory.”2
For a visitor to Israel and the West Bank in 2008, the most strik-
ing manifestation of the occupation is clearly the West Bank barrier. 
Approved by Israel in 2002 following a series of suicide bombings by 
Palestinian militants, the barrier’s stated purpose is to protect Israeli 
citizens from further attacks. Although a 2004 advisory opinion of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the “Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories” 
found that the current route of the barrier—87% of which runs inside 
the West Bank rather than along the Green Line—and the associated 
gate and permit system violated Israel’s obligations under interna-
tional law, construction of the barrier continues, with approximately 
57% of the announced route completed and 9% still under construction 
as of July 2008.3 It is important to note, however, that the barrier is only 
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one feature of the current closure regime that restricts the freedom of 
movement of Palestinians and their access to agricultural lands, water 
resources, services, and jobs. The regime also includes various types of 
physical obstacles (earth mounds, trenches, roadblocks, staffed check-
points, and random or “flying” checkpoints) that restrict mobility and 
access within Palestinian territory. According to UNOCHA, there were 
just over 600 of these internal obstacles throughout the West Bank at 
the end of April 2008.4
These physical obstacles operate in conjunction with a permit sys-
tem run by the Civil Administration in the Occupied Territories. Today 
every Palestinian man or woman with a West Bank ID card must apply 
for a permit, as well as the magnetic card that is a prerequisite for 
receiving a permit, to enter Israel (including East Jerusalem, which 
has been formally annexed to Israel) whether for work or to access 
services, including medical care. Permits are also required to cross at 
internal checkpoints during an “encirclement,” and to enter the “seam 
area” (the area isolated between the barrier and the Green Line), which 
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has declared a “closed military zone.”5 
It should be noted that access to this zone has been restricted not only 
for Palestinians who live east of the barrier and who now require per-
mits to access their farms and wells, but also for those whose villages 
are located within the seam area. These Palestinians currently require 
special permits to live in their own homes. Palestinians often wait for 
long periods for their permits and there is no guarantee that individu-
als who apply for permits will actually receive them.
Even with the required permit, crossing checkpoints can be a long 
and arduous process for Palestinians. When traveling from the West 
Bank to East Jerusalem, for example, permit holders are only allowed 
to cross the barrier through four of the seventeen existing checkpoints, 
and only by foot. There are also restrictions on the times of day during 
which permit holders may cross. This can result in long delays, par-
ticularly for workers trying to enter East Jerusalem during the morn-
ing rush hour.6 But long delays are not only the result of the limited 
number of checkpoints open to Palestinians. Palestinians are also made 
to wait at checkpoints, often for prolonged periods, while their docu-
ments undergo a routine check by soldiers.7 These long waits are made 
more difficult for Palestinians by what has been characterized as the 
arbitrariness of the entire closure regime. According to observers, rules 
governing checkpoints change constantly, often based on the whim of 
the particular soldiers on duty. Because of this, “[t]he people waiting 
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never know when—and if—they will be able to continue on their way, 
or whether they’ll be required to turn back.”8 One result of the waiting 
and the uncertainty is an increase in the daily stress and humiliation 
experienced by Palestinians.
In addition, the closure regime also restricts the access of Palestin-
ians to main roads throughout the West Bank. Cars with Palestinian 
license plates are prohibited from traveling on certain roads, and they 
are prevented from accessing other roads not by an official prohibi-
tion, but by long delays that result from the limited number of staffed 
checkpoints open to Palestinian vehicles. The result is that most Pal-
estinians are forced to take longer routes on poor quality roads. This 
significantly increases their travel time and costs.9
The overall effect of the closure regime has been devastating for Pal-
estinian society and for the economy of the West Bank. Restrictions on 
Palestinians’ freedom of movement have made it extremely difficult, 
and in many cases impossible, for people to access jobs, agricultural 
lands, services, and medical care. They prevent people from visiting 
their family and their friends. The long waits for permits and at check-
points also rob Palestinians of their time—time for work, time for edu-
cation, time for leisure activities.10 With regard to economic activity, 
because the economy of the West Bank depends on trade (the majority 
of which is with Israel) and remittances from jobs in Israel, the closure 
regime, with its restrictions on the movement of people and also goods, 
has contributed to economic decline. This results in high unemploy-
ment and increased reliance on food aid, among other hardships. As 
the World Bank stated in 2007, with reference to the OPT, “no economy 
can develop without mobility.”11 Finally, a number of other serious 
concerns about the closure regime have been raised by international 
and local organizations. These include the delay or denial of passage 
through checkpoints of the sick and/or those who are accompanying 
the sick, the delay of ambulances, violent assaults against Palestinians 
by soldiers at checkpoints, and damage to Palestinian property.
*****
In general, the need for humanitarian assistance arises only when gov-
ernments, and also combatants in times of armed conflict, have been 
either unable or unwilling to shoulder their responsibilities under 
international law.12 In cases of occupation, responsibility for the popu-
lation living in the occupied area lies with the occupying power. Thus, 
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the need for humanitarian assistance in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritories has resulted primarily from Israel’s failure to fulfil its legal 
obligations to the Palestinian people.13 These obligations are clearly 
defined in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), in particular, the 
1907 Hague Convention and its annexed regulations and the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War.14 In very basic terms, the provisions of these Conventions 
require that Israeli authorities respect and protect the Palestinian popu-
lation and its property, and that they take all necessary steps to ensure 
the well being of this population—steps which include, inter alia, ensur-
ing access to food, water, and medical care; maintaining public order; 
and enforcing the law.15 In addition, with respect to the current restric-
tions on Palestinians’ freedom of movement, the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has made it clear that while Israel has 
the right under international law to protect itself, “the measures used 
to do so must allow the occupied population to live as normal a life as 
possible.”16 Where the basic needs of the population are not being met, 
the occupying power must, under international law, agree to allow 
assistance programs operated by impartial international organizations, 
such as the ICRC or United Nations agencies. It is important to note, 
however, that these assistance programs do not relieve Israel of its 
responsibilities to the Palestinian people. “Humanitarian agencies may 
thus offer their services and operate in cooperation with the Israeli 
authorities but they are prohibited from providing assistance in lieu of 
the occupying power or pre-empting Israel’s responsibility.”17
The current humanitarian effort in the OPT involves many differ-
ent actors. Included in these is the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA), which was established by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in 1949 to implement relief and works programs for Pal-
estinian refugees. Today, UNRWA is the main provider of educational, 
health, and social services to the more than one million Palestinian 
refugees in the Occupied Territories. It also provides emergency assis-
tance in the form of food, temporary job creation, and the rebuilding 
of shelters—assistance that has become critical for many in the context 
of the current closure regime. There are a number of other UN agen-
cies active in the humanitarian effort in the OPT, including UNICEF, 
the World Food Program, and the World Health Organization. Since 
2000, the work of these agencies has been coordinated by OCHA-OPT. 
Joining the United Nations is a host of international non-governmental 
organizations. These NGOs range from large organizations like the 
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ICRC, which has been serving in its traditional dual role of emergency 
assistance provider and guardian of IHL since 1967, to much smaller 
organizations like the Christian Peacemaker Teams, whose volunteers 
in Hebron attempt to protect Palestinian civilians by direct non-vio-
lent intervention in situations of violence. In addition to international 
NGOs, there are also a number of local Israeli organizations (some 
with Palestinian partners) that are active in providing humanitarian 
relief and protection to the Palestinian people. Among other things, 
the members of these organizations rebuild Palestinian homes after 
they have been demolished by Israeli authorities, assist Palestinians at 
checkpoints, provide material aid including medical care to Palestin-
ians in need, and accompany Palestinian farmers as they work their 
fields in order to protect them from settler violence. Although there 
are important differences among them, what makes these local Israeli 
organizations particularly interesting, from the perspective of this 
study, is that many of them are not “purely” humanitarian in the sense 
of providing relief and protection in accordance with the principles of 
impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Rather, they are political 
organizations working to protect human rights, to build peaceful rela-
tions between Palestinians and Israelis, and, above all, to end Israel’s 
occupation of the Palestinian Territories, that have integrated humani-
tarian activities into their political work.
The next part of the essay will explore some of the dilemmas facing 
humanitarian organizations working in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritories. It will focus primarily on the example of Machsom Watch, an 
Israeli organization established in response to the problems of mobility 
and access discussed earlier in the essay. The work of Machsom Watch 
reveals the tensions that are inherent in humanitarian action as orga-
nizations try to “assist populations without contributing to the forces 
responsible for their suffering.”18 It also reveals the serious difficul-
ties faced by organizations that attempt to combine humanitarian and 
political work.
*****
Machsom Watch is an organization of Israeli women, self-described 
“peace activists,” who are opposed to Israel’s occupation of the Pales-
tinian Territories and to its oppression of the Palestinian people. It was 
founded in February 2001 by a small group of women who, after read-
ing newspaper reports about abuses at checkpoints, decided to go see 
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for themselves what was happening. Machsom Watch’s main objective 
is to raise awareness about the restrictions on Palestinians’ freedom of 
movement and their far-reaching implications, which the organization 
describes as “one of the occupation’s severest aspects.”19 Its main activ-
ity is monitoring checkpoints in Jerusalem and throughout the West 
Bank. Every day, volunteers from Machsom Watch observe events at 
dozens of checkpoints and document their observations. In so doing, 
many of these volunteers subject themselves to the disapproval of fam-
ily and friends as well as to verbal and physical attacks by Israeli set-
tlers. These observations are then made public, in Israel and around 
the world, through the organization’s website, electronic mailings, 
published reports, and photo exhibits. In addition to their main activ-
ity of monitoring checkpoints, Machsom Watch volunteers also act to 
assist Palestinians in a number of ways. First, they intervene directly 
at checkpoints in cases in which Palestinians are being intimidated or 
subjected to physical violence. In the most serious cases of violence 
and intimidation, Machsom Watch volunteers also file written com-
plaints with the Israeli authorities. They also intervene in other cases, 
for example, to help the sick and the elderly through checkpoints and 
to secure the release of detainees. Second, Machsom Watch volunteers 
help Palestinians navigate the complexities of the permit system by, 
for example, filing appeals for farmers who have been refused per-
mits to access their land in the seam area. It is significant to note that 
the women of Machsom Watch did not initially plan to engage in 
assistance activities. In fact, their own rule was that they would never 
intervene at checkpoints except in cases of physical or verbal abuse of 
Palestinians. From almost the very beginning, however, they found that 
they could not stand silently by as sick children were denied access to 
needed medical treatment or as men and women were detained for 
hours in handcuffs, so they moved increasingly toward the provision 
of humanitarian aid.20
Through their monitoring and assistance activities, Machsom Watch 
volunteers have been able to help many individual Palestinians, who 
are often in desperate need, and also to improve the overall situation at 
the checkpoints. As stated in the organization’s 2004 report: “From the 
experience we’ve accumulated over the past four years, we know that 
soldiers at the checkpoints tend to use less physical violence when we 
are watching. This bears out our belief that our presence has a moderat-
ing influence on the army’s conduct in and around the checkpoints.”21 
Significantly, however, the report goes on to say “[a]t the same time, it’s 
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clear to us that the soldiers act cautiously around us, the watchers and 
reporters, but lose their restraint when we are absent.”22
Machsom Watch volunteers are also making positive connec-
tions with Palestinians. This is particularly important at a time when 
“[v]irtually all interactions between Palestinians and Israelis…occur 
either through press reports about violence or at checkpoints in the 
presence of guns.”23 The response from Palestinians to Machsom 
Watch and its activities at checkpoints has been very positive.24 Yet 
volunteers do receive some negative reactions to their presence. These 
reactions hint at some of the complexities of humanitarian action in the 
OPT, especially for Israeli organizations that are attempting to combine 
humanitarian assistance with their political efforts to end the occupa-
tion.
*****
Some of the most profound dilemmas facing humanitarian organiza-
tions working in the OPT concern the ways in which humanitarian aid 
can help to sustain, and to bestow legitimacy on, Israel’s occupation of 
the Palestinian Territories. One of these ways is through relieving Israel 
of its obligations to protect and ensure the well being of the Palestinian 
population. According to Mary Anderson, there is a widespread view 
that aid helps to sustain the occupation by enabling the continuation 
of Israel’s repressive policies and practices—that aid rebuilds what 
Israel destroys and that it simply “maintains” levels of poverty that 
have resulted from current restrictions on mobility and access and 
other forms of Israeli control.25 This dilemma is perhaps most obvi-
ous in the case of humanitarian organizations that provide material 
assistance—such as food, medical care, the rebuilding of shelters—to 
the Palestinian population, but it confronts all organizations engaged 
in humanitarian work in the OPT. One illustration is the ICRC’s Family 
Visit Programme, which was set up in 1967 to enable families living 
in the OPT to visit relatives held in Israeli detention centers. While 
ICRC staff members recently celebrated the fortieth anniversary of this 
important program, they did so with the recognition that it is, in part, 
the existence of the program that enables Israel to detain individuals 
so far from their homes and families in the first place.26 For Machsom 
Watch, the specific concern is that while their efforts to assist Palestin-
ians in crossing checkpoints and navigating the permit system can help 
in individual cases, these efforts may do little to bring about change in 
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the overall closure regime and may unwittingly, by addressing some of 
the most problematic aspects of this regime, make it more sustainable. 
In addition, the inequality inherent in the provision of humanitarian 
aid may help to sustain the occupation by weakening the ability of Pal-
estinian organizations to resist oppression.27
Another dilemma facing humanitarian organizations in the OPT is 
that while working with the Israeli government can help to get things 
done, it can also contribute to legitimizing Israel’s authority over the 
Palestinian population and territory. As Fiona Terry argues, humani-
tarian action can bestow legitimacy on individuals, rebel movements, 
and governing regimes in a number of ways.28 One of the ways in 
which humanitarian action helps to legitimize the Israeli government 
and its occupation of the Palestinian Territories is through the negotia-
tions that take place between aid organizations and Israeli military and 
government officials—negotiations which implicitly recognize Israel’s 
authority in the OPT. For Machsom Watch, this dilemma is one that 
is confronted whenever volunteers intervene with soldiers at check-
points to help Palestinians through, phone military commanders to 
report cases of harassment and abuse, or meet with Israeli officials to 
raise issues of concern. What makes it particularly challenging is that 
the effectiveness of the organization in addressing the humanitarian 
needs of the Palestinian population is due in part to the contacts that 
Machsom Watch volunteers have formed with Israeli military and gov-
ernment officials as well as to their ability, as Israelis, to connect with 
soldiers and appeal to them as members of the same society.29 Refer-
ring to an offer of assistance Machsom Watch received from Israeli 
authorities early in the organization’s history, one of the group’s found-
ers noted: “Then as now, the line between contact with the military 
and collaboration with them was a very fine one. In retrospect, it might 
have been better had we not availed ourselves of this ‘assistance.’ This 
would have diminished our ‘fire-fighting’ capacity, but would have 
strengthened our position as radical opposition.”30
*****
These and other dilemmas of humanitarian action in the OPT are well-
known to the women of Machsom Watch as well as to other individu-
als and organizations involved in providing relief and protection to 
the Palestinian people. They are regularly discussed and debated both 
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within and between organizations. The problem is that there are no 
easy solutions. The dilemmas highlight the limitations of humanitari-
anism in the absence of a political process leading to a just resolution 
of the conflict. Given that the option of withdrawing assistance is one 
that many find morally unacceptable, the question then becomes how 
to minimize the negative effects of aid; specifically, the ways in which 
aid can help to sustain and bestow legitimacy on Israel’s occupation 
of the Palestinian Territories. One recent and, it appears, growing 
response to this question among local and international aid organiza-
tions has been to insist that Israel fulfil its responsibilities as an occu-
pying power under international law, and to ensure that humanitarian 
aid is provided in compliance with international law. As noted by 
David Shearer and Francine Pickup of OCHA-OPT, “[t]he obvious 
answer to the dilemmas of aid in the OPT—international humanitar-
ian law—remains missing. IHL states simply that the welfare of Pal-
estinians is the obligation of the occupying state, which in this case is 
Israel.”31 This response has been prompted in part by recent rulings of 
the Israeli Supreme Court, which have acknowledged the applicability 
of at least certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions to the OPT, as 
well as by the 2004 ICJ advisory opinion on the West Bank barrier. In 
addition to determining that the current route of the barrier violated 
Israel’s obligations under international law, this opinion “also held that 
all states are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation 
created by the barrier’s construction and ‘not to render aid or assis-
tance in maintaining the situation created by such construction.’ ”32 Like 
other organizations, Machsom Watch has also broadened its efforts to 
ensure that Israel fulfils its responsibilities under international law 
through the 2005 establishment, by some of its volunteers, of a new 
organization called Yesh Din (Volunteers for Human Rights). Yesh Din 
is working to address problems of law enforcement in the OPT, includ-
ing, for example, the failure of authorities to effectively enforce the law 
regarding Israelis who have committed offences against Palestinians 
and their property.33 This emphasis on international law, while not 
eliminating the dilemmas of humanitarian action in the OPT, can help 
organizations to minimize the negative effects of aid.
Especially for Israeli organizations that have integrated humani-
tarian assistance into their political work, the challenge goes beyond 
insisting that Israel fulfil its responsibilities under international law 
and ensuring that aid is provided in compliance with international law. 
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There are inevitable tensions—some argue a contradiction—between 
the provision of humanitarian aid and political efforts to end the occu-
pation. These tensions and the trade-offs that they require have led 
some individuals and organizations to stand firmly against combin-
ing humanitarian and political work.34 For those organizations that 
attempt to do both, it is important that they guard against the way 
in which humanitarian acts can “deflect attention from the political 
causes of the conflict.”35 As Jeff Halper reminds us, this is a political 
conflict, not a humanitarian crisis. “The conflict contains a humanitar-
ian crisis, but one that has been induced by Israel as a means of forcing 
the Palestinians to submit to its political dictates.”36 Halper argues that 
Israeli organizations must avoid a “humanitarian framing” of their 
activities, which can turn a political story of occupation and oppres-
sion into a humanitarian one of Israelis helping Palestinians.37
This essay has reflected upon the dilemmas of humanitarian action 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. What these dilemmas reveal, 
above all, are the limitations of humanitarian action in the absence of a 
political process to resolve the conflict. They also reveal the profound 
challenges facing organizations that provide humanitarian assistance 
to the Palestinian people. In providing this assistance, these organiza-
tions must work to minimize the negative effects of aid. One way in 
which they can do this is through a greater emphasis on international 
law. For Israeli organizations that combine humanitarian and political 
work, there is no way to avoid the trade-offs that this involves, and 
different groups may evaluate these trade-offs differently. The impor-
tant point for all of them is to acknowledge the competing principles 
involved in humanitarian and political work and to reflect on the polit-
ical, as well as the legal, effects of their humanitarian activities. •
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